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Abstract:  Polycentric governance networks are on the rise in global energy and climate 
governance, but we know surprisingly little about their effectiveness. This paper analyzes the 
performance of four such transnational energy and climate governance networks. In the realm 
of sustainable energy, our cases are the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(REEEP) and the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC). In the climate sphere, we 
examine the effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Clinton Climate 
Initiative (CCI). Using principles from governance and public administration about the 
effectiveness of institutions, we examine the extent to which four networks have contributed 
to improving governance outcomes in the spheres of climate and sustainable energy. Our 
evaluation focuses on the clarity of purpose, funding, institutional formality, efficacy,  and 
level of resilience of these networks. Some differences between the networks notwithstanding, 
we find that the transnational governance networks generally fail to meet the criteria about 
what constitutes an effective institution.  The paper concludes with a reflection on what could 
be done to enhance the performance of these governance networks.  
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1. Introduction  
The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015, epitomizes an important shift in 
global climate governance. Whereas early efforts to tackle climate change concentrated on 
negotiating a global agreement with binding targets—the Kyoto Protocol being a 
paradigmatic example—the focus has gradually shifted to less top-down, more diverse and 
more multi-levelled governance frameworks. The nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
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which were prepared by all parties to the Paris Agreement are but one indicator of this trend. 
In addition to action at the state level, a ‘groundswell’ of climate actions has emerged as 
cities, regions, businesses and civil society groups have started to step up their acts on 
mitigation and adaptation (Chan et al., 2015; Hale, 2016). As a result, the climate governance 
landscape has started to exhibit some of the characteristics of what Ostrom called ‘polycentric 
systems’—that is, systems characterized by multiple governing authorities at differing scales 
rather than a monocentric unit (Jordan et al., 2015; Sovacool 2011; Ostrom, 2010; Dorsch and 
Flachsland, 2017). It is also having to attune itself to more active attempts at rapid transition 
or ‘deep decarbonisation’ (Geels et al., 2017). 
A variety of new terms have come to describe polycentrism as it has become more 
important in theoretical and empirical policy debates. Whether referring to ‘polycentrism’ 
(Ostrom, 2010), ‘building blocks’ (Stewart et al., 2013; Falkner et al., 2013), ‘regime 
complexes’ (Keohane and Victor, 2009; Abbott, 2012; Colgan et al., 2012), ‘polyphonic 
federalism’ (Sovacool, 2011) or ‘bottom-up approaches’ (Rayner, 2010), there is recognition 
that global climate governance has increasingly come to encompass action by sub- and non-
state actors (Cole, 2015; Hale, 2016). What makes a polycentric approach so attractive is that 
it avoids using the ‘government’ or the ‘state’ as the single point of reference (Ostrom 2010; 
Cole 2015). As other authors who adhere to a polycentric approach have noted, “polycentric 
networks transcend the traditional ideas of jurisdictional integrity in state-centric systems” 
(Skelcher, 2005: p. 89).  
Other voices are more critical of the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. 
According to these critics, governance networks and partnerships “can lead to a ‘hollowing 
out’ of the state, reinforce neoliberalism and accelerate privatization of environmental 
governance, […] increased business influence, power inequalities and skewed representation 
of stakeholders, fragmentation of global governance, reinforcement of elite multilateralism 
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and the retreat of state responsibility in the production of public goods” (Bäckstrand, 2008, p. 
78). Besides accountability issues, questions are also raised over the effectiveness of 
polycentric approaches to climate governance. Jordan et al. (2015), for example, argue that 
“before we raise our hopes, we should better understand how the new forms of governing are 
actually (not) performing” (Jordan et al., 2015: p. 3).  
Heeding that call, this paper qualitatively analyzes the performance of governance 
networks in the energy and climate sphere. Using principles from governance and public 
administration about the effectiveness of institutions, we examine the extent to which four 
such polycentric governance networks have contributed to improving governance outcomes in 
the spheres of climate and sustainable energy. Put another way, we examine network 
effectiveness, or the ability for that network to meet its own missions and goals.  In the realm 
of sustainable energy, our cases are the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(REEEP) and the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC). In the climate sphere, we 
examine the effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Clinton Climate 
Initiative (CCI). 
The remainder of this paper starts with a discussion of our research methods and key 
concepts, and outlines our polycentric governance assessment framework. Next, the paper 
discusses and evaluates the four case studies in light of this framework. We conclude with a 
reflection on options to enhance the effectiveness of these governance networks.  
2. Research methods: Qualitative case study analysis  
The purpose of this study is to examine the performance of ‘polycentric governance 
networks’ in the domains of climate and energy. Transnational networks are defined by 
Andanova et al. (2009) as sharing three key features.  First, they operate in the transnational 
sphere instead of being domestic governance networks. Second, they seek to address some 
form of public goal. Third and most importantly, they are composed of various actors and 
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organizations that recognize the authority of the network, but are also recognized by network 
authorities as legitimate parts of the network. The constituents of such networks may be 
public bodies and actors, private ones, or a mix thereof (Andanova et al., 2009). Transnational 
governance networks, by definition, are therefore polycentric.  
Our core method is a qualitative, comparative, case study approach drawn from a 
synthesis of peer-reviewed literature as well as current reports and documents related to our 
four polycentric energy and climate networks.  The cases have been selected on the basis of 
their budget (i.e., they all have funding in the order of multiple millions of dollars), duration 
of existence (i.e., they all exist since at least 2010), operational span (i.e., they all operate 
transnationally), scope (they all focus on aspects related to either sustainable energy or 
climate mitigation) and network governance character (they fit a three-tiered definition as 
described above). The resulting sample of cases was expected to share enough background 
conditions to be considered a homogenous population, while still exhibiting considerable 
variation in governance characteristics.  
Since our study is explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that 
focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others, our 
research method corresponds to what has been called interpretive (Lijphart, 1971: 691) or 
disciplined-configurative (Eckstein, 1973: 99–104) case studies. To be fair, our assessment of 
effectiveness is therefore shorter term, and it would not capture longer durations that may be 
more suitable to analyzing effectiveness (Sabatier, 1986).  In addition, there hardly exist in-
depth studies of these cases, some exceptions notwithstanding (e.g., Pattberg et al., 2009; 
Parthan et al., 2010; Szulecki et al., 2011; Vanderheiden, 2015; Widerberg and Stripple, 
2016).   
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3. Polycentric governance assessment framework 
Polycentrism, a form of governance that blends scales and/or types of actors 
(Visseren-Hamakers, 2015; Galaz et al. 2012) is related to the more recent literature on 
‘network governance’ and ‘governance networks’. McGinnis and Ostrom (2012) note that the 
concept of polycentricity, first laid out by Michael Polanyi (1951) and later adopted by 
Vincent Ostrom et al. (1961), can be seen as an early statement of the critical importance of 
network forms of governance in democratic societies. Yet, the more recent literature on 
network governance and governance networks rarely makes any mention to this pioneering 
work (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012), despite the similarity of the concepts. Nonetheless, the 
‘governance networks’ that are formed by actors from the state, the market and civil society to 
address climate change can be said to provide ‘polycentric governance’ in the sense that they 
include the self-organizing relationship between many centers of decision-making that are 
formally independent of each other (Ostrom et al., 1961: p. 831; Ostrom, 2010). 
In this section we propose four criteria, drawn mostly from the literature on public 
administration, policy sciences, and governance, to assess the performance of polycentric 
energy and climate networks, building on an earlier study by Poocharoen and Sovacool 
(2012). We employ the term ‘performance’, which allows for a more contextualized 
evaluation compared with the concept of ‘effectiveness’. Whereas effectiveness usually refers 
to ‘outcome’ (i.e., goal attainment), performance refers more to ‘process’ (i.e., the manner by 
which outputs and outcomes are achieved). Here, we argue it includes the ability of the 
network to (1) set clear goals; (2) mobilize resources; (3) adopt formal structures; (4) make 
internal operations more efficient; and (5) exhibit resilience. We maintain that these criteria 
are fundamental elements of organizational and institutional arrangements applicable to 
network settings.  We now discuss each criterion in detail. 
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3.1 Clarity of purpose 
It is intuitive that effective networks should have a clear sense of their goals and 
missions. Goal orientation of network members is a crucial part to make the network long-
lasting. For any entity to measure the level of success first it must have a sense of purpose for 
its existence. Goals, missions, visions, objectives are expressions of an entity’s purpose. 
Networks with clearly stated goals will often also have clear roles and responsibilities among 
members (Goodin, 1998). Also studies have shown that the success of a network is partly 
determined by whether there is alignment with different levels of goals of member agencies 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008).  Clarity of purpose does not occur naturally but rather members 
must go through a process to have dialogues which creates a discourse to shape ideas and 
common understandings (Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012).  
3.2 Funding 
Though funding can come with strings attached, implying a loss of autonomy and 
authority for the recipient governance network, a sufficient independent and continual source 
of funding is an important criterion to judge the effectiveness of networks. Often networks 
rely on their members to pool resources to implement network-led projects. The dilemma may 
arise where organizations, as members of networks, are also struggling to secure their funding 
and make use of their limited funds. Giving such resources away to the network might not be 
in their best interest. In addition, often network-led programs have multiple goals in nature, 
which may make them less attractive to donors or potential sponsors. Networks that can 
overcome such problems are prone to be more effective (Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012).  
3.3 Institutional Formality  
Institutional formality refers to two aspects: whether the network has formal 
recognition; and whether partners have a formal structure to interact. Some indicators of 
having formal recognition includes having a permanent secretariat and full time staff. Also the 
7 
 
network might have legal status and it can be supported by established international entities. 
Legal formalization of networks helps to launch and sustain the network. However, it is also 
important to strike a balance and make sure the network can stay flexible and adapt to new 
structures and arrangements when needed (Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012).  
3.4 Efficacy  
Efficacy refers generally to how effective the network operates. It has an internal and 
an external dimension.  Internally, a key to managing networks is the capacity for partners to 
collaborate effectively. As for the external dimension of efficacy, it refers to how much 
influence the network has on altering actual policies or behavior. The external efficacy can 
only be assessed in view of a partnership‘s intended function (Bäckstrand, 2006), not in 
relation to whether it actually solves an environmental issue. This means that information-
sharing partnerships are effective when there is a significant exchange of relevant knowledge 
between members; capacity-building partnerships would have to enhance members’ ability to 
develop new practices to respond to environmental issues; and rule-setting partnerships 
should produce broadly accepted and enforceable norms (Hahn and Pinkse, 2014). 
3.5 Resilience  
Of all the five criteria, this is the only one that distinguishes networks from single 
organizations. This criterion of resilience and strong ties illustrates the importance of inter-
organizational relationships between network members, as well as elements of adaptability 
and the resolution of conflict. The relationships themselves are at the core of what makes the 
network ‘a network’. The network should have a life of its own. Members should be able to 
enter and leave the network without disrupting the direction and work of the network. Loose 
ties can be more adaptive (wider members, less formality, less clear objectives) but it can also 
make it difficult to mobilize as a single unit. Thus it is important to judge the strength of ties 
among network members to gauge its effectiveness.  Moreover, resilient networks can adapt 
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and evolve to challenges and even continue to function after they have fulfilled their mandate, 
and tend to have formal modes of conflict resolution, arbitration, or consensus style methods 
of decision-making so that when members disagree, the entire network does not collapse 
(Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012). 
4. The performance of four polycentric networks  
In this section, we apply the five principles to each of our four climate and energy 
networks. Each subsection progresses with the same structure: it begins with a brief 
introduction and description of the case before turning to a qualitative evaluation of how it 
performs among each criterion.  To that end, we apply a relatively straightforward 4-point 
scale consisting of: weak, moderately weak, moderately strong, and strong.1   
4.1 Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) 
The William J. Clinton Foundation is a nonprofit organization created in 1997 by the 
former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who launched the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) in 
2006. The Clinton Foundation manages about $220 million in assets and operating expenses 
each year, of which about $8 million goes to CCI.  CCI is a network because it is funded by 
private individuals and foundations but also works closely (and formally) with subpartners 
including other donors, governments, research institutes, and communities.  The CCI 
currently focuses on three strategic program areas: Energy Efficiency (which focuses on 
reducing energy use among worldwide buildings), Forestry (which focuses on improving land 
use practices to reduce poverty and curb GHG emissions), and Island Energy (which seeks to 
address the climate change impacts facing small island nations). Previously, its core program 
elements were Cities, Clean Energy, and Forestry (CCI, 2009).  In August 2006 it became the 
action arm of the C40 ‘Climate Leadership Group’, a consortium of large cities committed to 
                                                 
1 We could have gone with a numerical scale, but did not want to hide the qualitative or judgmental aspect of our 
evaluation. 
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reducing GHGs. The organization has program staff in many of these cities (called ‘partner’ 
cities). 
   
Clarity of purpose (moderately strong) 
The clarity of purpose within the CCI is moderately strong, as its central focus has 
always been on the energy and climate spheres. The reason it has only moderate strength, 
however, is that the purpose of the organization continues to change, sometimes dramatically.  
For instance, in 2006, the Cities Program was the most developed program at the start of the 
CCI. CCI City Directors in partner cities delivered three types of capacity building during the 
earlier years of the Initiative: technical and analytical assistance, project assistance, and 
purchasing and financial assistance (CCI, 2009b). 
However, after 2010, it was replaced and augmented with the Energy Efficiency 
Program. Similarly, CCI cancelled its former Clean Energy Program which had focused on 
two low-carbon technologies in the power sector: Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), which 
isolates CO2 emissions from power plants and other industrial facilities, and Concentrated 
Solar Power, which harnesses the sun’s heat to run conventional turbines or engines. CCI 
failed at its ability to deliver large-scale demonstration projects around the world.  
Funding (moderately weak) 
A second moderate challenge is funding. Although CCI is perhaps comparatively 
well-funded to other climate and energy networks, it has weaker status within the Clinton 
Foundation.   For the last fiscal year for which data was available (2013-2014), CCI received 
$8.2 million or only 4% of the Foundation’s revenue, an amount both insufficient to achieve 
its goals and down from $8.4 million  (and 8% of the portfolio across the entire Clinton 
Foundation) in 2013 (Clinton Foundation, 2013-2014). 
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Institutional formality (moderately strong) 
The institutional formality of CCI is strong.  It has existed for more than a decade and 
remains a core part of funding within the Clinton Foundation, which has its own secretariat, 
offices, staff, and multimillion dollar budget.  CCI has also strengthened its legal 
formalization by partnering with other initiatives.  For example, the integration of the CCI’s 
Cities Program with the C40 alliance resulted in a joint initiative with a much stronger 
institutionalization, as it led to a doubling of the budget of the C40/CCI cities and allowed the 
CCI City Directors and programmatic teams to draw on the services of a secretariat in 
London. 
Efficacy (moderately weak) 
 Despite its potential, at a global scale, the external efficacy of the CCI remains weak.  
The most recently available CCI Annual Report claims that their efficiency program displaced 
35,000 tons of GHG emissions annually in the United States (Clinton Foundation, 2014), but 
the total amount emitted in 2014 for the country was 6.87 billion tons.  The Annual Report 
also notes that the CCI program added 100 kW of solar energy capacity in the Seychelles, but 
their national grid has more than 100,000 kW, meaning their contribution added only 0.1 
percent of capacity, inadequate expenditure related to need.  
There are also programmatic difficulties mitigating effectiveness.  In many cities, 
incentives are still misaligned against energy efficiency because lenders are unfamiliar with 
energy service providers and/or their technologies, because of the principal-agent problem 
involving landlords and tenants, or because people remain unsure about how to calculate the 
expected revenue from potential energy savings (Sovacool, 2011b). Others have limited 
budgets for energy efficiency projects, or may need to spend scarce time and resources on 
other more pressing matters.  Studies have noted serious difficulties confronting the 
environment the Island Energy Program operates in as well.  One critique of CCI’s operations 
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as well as other donors noted that in Small Island Developing States, aid is almost never 
accompanied by the necessary policy reforms; in general there has been a bias towards 
centralized electricity generation rather than rural energy services; and development 
assistance from some partners continues to be tied to particular suppliers, undermining value 
for money (Dornan and Shah, 2016). A second study noted that renewable energy targets set 
by donors such as CCI are often not supported by well-structured action plans, and that most 
countries continue to lack effective regulatory body responsible for energy planning and 
financial investment (Keeley, 2016).  Finally, the Forestry Program has faced impediments in 
implementation in places such as Tanzania.  There, although CCI commissioned the NGO 
Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative to provide expertise and resources for the 
completion of forest management plans and bylaws, documents became invalid before they 
were implemented, and almost half of implementing villages were unable to agree on joint 
boundaries necessary for effective management (Scheba and Mustalahti, 2015). 
Resilience (strong) 
Close connections to a former US president enabled the CCI to sit at the heart of a 
strong network of donors and partners.  One of their earlier programs related to transport in 
cities saw a global partnership between CCI and the Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy (ITDP) focusing on the implementation and improvement of Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) systems and bicycle networks. Projects in cities including Johannesburg, 
Bogota, Sao Paulo, and Mexico City are addressing route optimization, operational planning 
and, for BRT, fuel substitution. A CCI Hybrid Bus Test Program aimed to create a market for 
hybrid bus technology in Latin America and its Electric Vehicle Working Group brought 
together 12 cities in the C40 network to organize a coordinated procurement of electric 
vehicles by owners of public and private sector fleets.  In May 2009 CCI’s Cities program 
launched the Climate Positive Development Program working in concert with the U.S. Green 
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Building Council. In the domain of forestry, CCI has convened the “Carbon Measurement 
Collaborative,” a network of scientists and forestry experts in carbon modeling, land use 
change, and satellite imaging to design and implement the NCAS in partner countries.  
4.2 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Program (REEEP) 
Deeply affected by debates within the G8 about sustainable development, electricity, 
energy poverty, and renewable sources of energy, a collection of actors from the private 
sector, public sector, multilateral finance, and civil society decided to create REEEP in 2002.  
The network’s mission is rooted in three central areas: climate change mitigation, energy 
access, and encouraging energy efficiency, conservation, and demand-side management.  
Voluntary contributions from its member states make up most of REEEP’s budget and the 
network does not place restrictions on membership. 
Clarity of purpose (strong) 
The clarity of purpose for REEEP is relatively strong compared to our other case 
studies.  The network supports only projects that can be scaled up in a “variety of different 
regulatory frameworks,” in essence meaning their efforts and projects are designed to work in 
various countries and in different types of energy markets (Florini and Sovacool, 2010).  One 
key part of this strategy is to overcome the remaining barriers to renewable energy by 
employing attorneys and technical experts to proposed changes to government regulation and 
policy.  Another important part of their strategy is providing low-cost financing for projects so 
that entrepreneurs and investors can deploy cleaner technology in emerging markets.  A third 
component is maintaining “technology neutrality,” enabling its partners to decide which 
particular low-carbon technologies they want to adopt or deploy (Parthan et al., 2010).   
Their most recent strategy espoused in their 2015 Annual Report emphasizes that 
REEEP (2015) seeks to target their efforts at entrepreneurs and the “missing middle” in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency finance.  They note that small- and medium-sized 
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enterprises often make up 85% of employment in developing countries and two-thirds of 
GDP, yet remain under-utilized.  REEEP hopes to catalyze and even galvanize the missing 
middle to harness the power of entrepreneurship to promote innovation in financing and 
technology.   
Funding (weak) 
Although REEEP has many actors through which it raises revenue, in a global sense 
its market presence and influence remains weak.  REEEP collects about $9 to $12 million in 
funding each year as part of its operational budget, the largest portion given from the 
governments of Norway and the United Kingdom.  Yet the network spends more than ten 
times this amount on actual projects through money raised from its extensive network. For 
instance, in 2010, REEEP had managed almost 150 projects in 56 countries with a combined 
worth of $90 million, most of this supported through private equity financing with REEEP 
serving as a matchmaker, with 37 new projects in the design phase (Florini and Sovacool, 
2010; Parthan et al., 2010).  
However, in the most recent funding cycle of 2014/2015, REEEP held only a total of 
€5.99 million in project funds under management.  Not only has this amount declined 
precipitously from the previous decade, it pales considerably both to global investment figures 
for clean energy or the amount needed to achieve universal energy access. For instance, in 
2016, the global renewable energy sector received $285.9 billion in investment, and (since 
REEEP’s focus is on small-scale systems), distributed/off-grid distributed systems received at 
least $300 million (REN21 2016).  Analysts have also generated a number of estimates of the 
cost of providing universal energy access in developing countries, and these estimates range 
from as little as $30 billion per year to as much as USD $130 billion per year (Sovacool et al., 
2016). 
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Institutional formality (strong) 
Institutional formality has also strengthened over time and is now relatively robust.  
For its first two years the network only conducted workshops related to renewable energy, 
focused on identifying stakeholders interested in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and 
had no secretariat.  An international secretariat was established in Vienna, Austria, in 2004.  
Its secretariat acts as a “central service hub” which collects and disseminates information and 
also provides support to the organization’s 18 regional secretaries.  A General Assembly for 
the network is in charge of overall strategy, a governing board manages the budget, and a 
program board and steering committee implements regional action plans.  It also has regional 
offices in Beijing, Washington D.C., Johannesburg, New Delhi, and Southbank.  
Efficacy (moderately weak) 
This network, also, is ineffective at accomplishing its goals. As previously noted, it 
operates on a much smaller scale than inter-governmental organizations.  It emphasizes 
facilitation and capacity and the majority of REEEP’s partners are bankers, financiers, and 
NGO managers.  One benefit to its structure is the flexibility it enables; because REEEP is 
relatively small, it can engage actors closer to the local scale, improving efficiency and 
accountability.  Another advantage is the iterative relationship between partners in the 
network.  Frequent interaction between members creates an intense amount of feedback about 
the effectiveness and challenges facing ongoing projects.  The network sponsors and manages 
frequent meetings and consultations with its partners as well, which helps ensure that “fresh” 
data are always being circulated to members. REEEP managers have stated that this tends to 
enhance effective implementation, done through a decentralized network closer to “people on 
the ground,” instead of relying on a “one-size-fits-all” strategy of implementing projects 
(Florini and Sovacool, 2009).  One interdisciplinary study noted that REEEP’s strengths 
included serving as a clearinghouse for knowledge about energy issues in developing 
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countries, possessing an active online platform and presence through their database and 
knowledge portal, and comprehensively identifying barriers to policy reform (Fadel et al., 
2013).  A more recent “Deep Impact Assessment” within the organization of 62 former and 
ongoing projects with impact across 32 countries noted that 79% of projects were deemed 
successes, while 8% were cancelled due to unforeseen circumstances and 13% were 
considered unsuccessful (REEEP, 2015). 
 Although this all sounds good, one serious disadvantage is that due to their smaller 
scale REEEP must simultaneously track scores of individual energy projects rather than, say, 
a large, massive power plant.  Moreover, REEEP’s large volume of members can create 
delays as those partners discuss, and at times disagree about, particular projects. Since the 
bulk of REEEP’s budget is from voluntary contributions, its planning horizon for projects is 
pervasive orientated towards the short-term.  Therefore, one study cautions that projects 
backed by REEEP (and other similar institutions in developing countries) often fail to provide 
comprehensive local financing for projects (Haselip et al., 2014).    A second one warns that 
REEEP suffers from salient weaknesses including the fact that they provide mainly advisory 
services instead of actual capital and loans, that their outputs are manly publications rather 
than patents or programs, and that they have weak links with beneficiaries, especially 
governments (Fadel et al., 2013).  
Resilience (moderately strong) 
Finally, REEEP does exhibit resilience.  It is supported primarily dozens of 
institutions including governments, private sector actors and associations, research institutes 
and intergovernmental organizations. Such a broad network ensures that if any of its 350 
partners leaves the network the others still enable it to function. In 2015, for instance, it 
received significant sources of funding from Norway, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland in 
addition to the European Union, CDKN (in the United Kingdom), International Renewable 
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Energy Agency, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Bank, in addition to others 
as well as private sector donations (REEEP, 2015). 
4.3 The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC) 
Launched in 2010, the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC) is a governance 
network hosted by the United Nations (UN) Foundation. The long-term goal of the alliance is 
universal adoption of clean cookstoves all over the world. By creating a global market for 
“clean and efficient household cooking solutions,” the alliance aspires to “save lives, improve 
livelihoods, empower women and protect the environment.”2 At present, more than 600 
million of the world’s households still use solid fuels in inefficient cookstoves and open fires, 
causing serious environmental and health impacts that disproportionally affect women and 
children (GACC, 2011).  
Clarity of purpose (strong) 
The alliance has an ambitious goal to foster the adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels 
in 100 million households by 2020—the so-called “100 by 20” goal, and it strives for 
universal adoption by 2030. In November 2011, the Alliance released a report “Igniting 
Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cooking Solutions.” The report, to 
which more than 350 sector exports contributed, identified the creation of a thriving global 
market for clean cookstoves and fuels as the most viable way to achieve universal adoption of 
clean cooking solutions, and offered a three-pronged strategy for building such a market: 
enhancing demand, strengthening supply, and fostering an enabling environment (GACC, 
2011). Conducting rigorous research is a major component of creating the environment 
necessary for increased awareness, funding, and action. The Alliance has already begun 
funding key research projects, as well as issued a request for applications related to decreasing 
stove-related injuries and deaths among young children.  Rather than adopting an aid-driven 
                                                 
2 http://cleancookstoves.org/about/, last accessed July 12, 2017. 
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approach, the Alliance promotes a decidedly market-based approach to promote switching to 
clean cookstoves. It reckons that past attempts to deliver clean cookstoves and encourage the 
use of clean fuels have failed because of a failure to understand and meet consumers’ needs, 
especially in those cases where cookstoves were subsidized for the end user but not selected 
to best meet their interests (GACC, 2011: 17). 
Funding (moderately strong) 
In its five-year progress report, the Alliance reported that it had attracted more than 
$413 million in pledges from governments, foundations and corporations to the sector. This 
includes $265 million in carbon finance. The partner base of the Alliance has expanded from 
just 19 at the launch to 1,300 partners. The Alliance has helped to drive more than 28 million 
cookstoves into the field by 2014, well on its way to reach its target of 100 million by 2020 
(GACC, 2015).  The only reason we give it a “moderately strong” score is that its budget 
remains insufficient to reach universal access of cleaner cooking devices, i.e., it does not have 
the resources to achieve its mission.  Bazilian et al. (2014) estimate that at least $1.8 billion is 
needed in annual investment to achieve universal access to cleaner cooking or a cumulative 
investment of about $89 billion (Bazilian et al., 2014; Fusonerini et al., 2014). 
Institutional formality (moderately strong) 
The GACC did not emerge ex nihilio.  The Alliance builds on a previous multi-
stakeholder initiative, launched by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a 
handful of partners at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. The 
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air (PCIA) grew to more than 590 partners, working in 116 
countries to reduce exposure to indoor air pollution from household energy use.3 In 2012, the 
PCIA has been formally integrated into the GACC. At the heart of this administrative choice 
to set up a new office in Washington D.C. with a new mission and vision, albeit with a 
                                                 
3 PCIA has a legacy website: http://www.pciaonline.org/.  
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decidedly modest budget and staff,4 was the beginning of a new ‘partnership approach’ in US 
diplomacy—a strategy to leverage public-private partnerships at the service of US foreign 
policy objectives (Zolli et al., 2015; Bazilian et al., 2017).  
Efficacy (moderately strong) 
The Alliance is the strongest of the four networks. It has commissioned assessments of 
the cookstove and fuel markets in 16 countries. Draft Market Assessments have been 
completed in 16 countries. Collaboration is currently strongest with six focus countries in 
Africa and Asia: Bangladesh, China, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda (GACC, 2014).  
One of the Alliance’s most significant achievements has been to draw international attention 
to the issues around inefficient cooking and household air pollution in the developing world – 
and to place the problem firmly on the public agenda. To aid this work they have secured 
support from a range of celebrity ambassadors including actress Julia Roberts and Ghanaian 
football star Stephen Appiah (Shell Foundation, 2014).  
In addition, the Alliance has helped to promote international cookstove standards. One 
of the greatest barriers to the widespread adoption of clean cookstoves has long been the lack 
of internationally-recognized clean cookstove standards and benchmarks to assess the quality 
of improved stoves and provide a valuable assurance for consumers and investors (GACC, 
2011, p. 17). In 2011, the Alliance and the International Standards Organisation (ISO) gained 
a broad consensus for a methodology to benchmark stove quality across several parameters 
including emissions reductions, fuel efficiency, durability and affordability – a big step 
towards this goal (Shell Foundation, 2014). 
                                                 
4 According to its own website, the GACC currently has a staff of 27 employees. It does not disclose its 
operating budget, but a Washington Post article mentioned it was in the order of $10 million a year. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/these-cheap-clean-stoves-were-supposed-to-save-millions-of-lives-
what-happened/2015/10/29/c0b98f38-77fa-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html  
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 We label the network only “moderately strong”, however, because of the barriers it 
faces in adoption.  Up in Smoke, a 2012 study by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in Cambridge, highlighted some of the ongoing challenges (Duflo et al., 2012). A 
randomized controlled study in Odisha, India, identified no long-term improvements in 
health, fuel consumption or — the authors inferred — GHG emissions in households that had 
been given a clean cooking-stove, primarily because the stoves were not being used. Although 
the devices had been distributed by the award-winning NGO Gram Vikas, they quickly fell 
into disuse, or were not maintained at a level that kept emissions low (Subramanian, 2014).  
Consequently, the study found no significant improvement in lung functioning, and several 
other health outcomes.  This underscores that market-based approaches may not always work 
at the bottom of the pyramid in communities in “extreme” or “hardcore poverty” (Sovacool 
and Drupady, 2012).  
 
Resilience (strong) 
The Alliance works with a strong network of public, private, and non-profit partners to  
accelerate the production, deployment, and use of clean and efficient cookstoves and fuels in 
developing countries. The Alliance’s partners include governments such as the United States, 
Germany, Norway, and Peru; international development organizations such as the World 
Bank, local NGOs, universities, as well as foundations and private companies such as Morgan 
Stanley and Shell.5   
4.4 The Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF), a network consisting of financiers, governments, 
development partners, and climate action groups, was conceived at the 2009 Copenhagen 
                                                 
5 For a full list, see: http://cleancookstoves.org/partners/.  
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climate talks and formally adopted at the Cancun climate conference in late 2010 (UNFCCC, 
2011a).  The GCF is the financial mechanism of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and is accountable to the Conference of the Parties (COP). It aims to 
make an “ambitious contribution” not only to “attaining the mitigation and adaptation goals 
set by the international community to combat climate change,” but also to promote “the 
paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways” 
(UNFCCC, 2011b). Over time, it is supposed to become the main multilateral financing 
mechanism to support climate action in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2012). The GCF 
works with a growing network of accredited entities to implement its projects. These partners 
on the ground may operate at international, regional, national and sub-national scales, and 
they may be public, private or hybrid entities.  
Clarity of purpose (weak) 
The GCF has been plagued by persistent differences between developed and 
developing countries, but also increasingly between board members and the secretariat on 
visions for the fund. These tensions already surfaced in the design phase of the GCF, where it 
became apparent that developed and developing countries had widely differing visions on the 
functions, mandate, scope and operational capabilities of the GCF (Schalatek et al., 2011). 
One contentious issue was the relationship of the GCF to the UNFCCC. Developing country 
negotiators from the G77+China sought to place the fund under the “authority” of the COP, as 
is the Adaptation Fund Board, rather than merely being accountable to and guided by it, like 
the Global Environmental Facility, which they perceived as dominated by donor state interests 
(Vanderheiden, 2016). 
In addition, the GCF has been off to a rocky start. Key donors have expressed concern 
that the GCF lacks focus and direction. In a series of submissions to the GCF board in 
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December 2015, officials from those and other countries warned of opaque decision-making, 
weak investment guidelines and poor engagement with the private sector (GCF, 2015).  
Funding (weak) 
The GCF became operational in the summer of 2014, commencing its initial resources 
mobilization process, even though important aspects of its institutional design and 
management still needed to be clarified (Lattanzio, 2014). The GCF was officially opened for 
capitalization at the UN climate summit in September 2014. By late May 2017, the GCF had 
raised $10.3 billion in pledges from 43 state governments.6 The largest contributors (in 
absolute terms) are the US ($3 billion), Japan ($1.5 billion), the UK ($1.2 billion), France ($1 
billion), and Germany ($1 billion).  While this might seem like a huge figure, especially 
compared to the other networks that we analyze here, it falls way short of the target of $100 
billion that advanced economies have formally agreed to jointly mobilize annually by 2020.  
Moreover, in June 2017, the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement and made it clear that the U.S. would stop financing the GCF.  With a pledge of 
$3 billion, the US is the single largest contributor to the GCF’s initial capitalization goal, but 
the new administration has made it amply clear that the remaining $2 billion will not be 
deposited. 
Institutional formality (Strong) 
After its establishment in 2010, the GCF’s institutional design and governance 
structure was further elaborated in the subsequent COPs. The 2011 Durban meeting adopted 
the basic design of the GCF as “the operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention” (UNFCCC, 2012).  It also set forth the composition of a board, to have 24 
members, composed of an equal number from developing and developed countries, with 
representation from relevant UN groupings including Small Island States (SIDS) and Least 
                                                 
6 For an overview of the pledges, see: http://www.greenclimate.fund/contributions/pledge-tracker.  
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Developed Countries (LDC). The 2012 Doha agreement endorsed the consensus decision of 
the GCF board to select Songdo, Incheon, Republic of Korea as the host of the GCF 
(UNFCCC, 2012). At the November 2013 conference in Warsaw, Ms. Héla Cheikhrouhou 
was appointed as the executive director for the GCF secretariat (UNFCCC, 2015).  
Efficacy (weak) 
In terms of effectiveness so far the impact of the fund has been limited.  Firstly, $10 
billion is a far cry from what is actually needed to invest in climate change interventions—
Flam and Skjaerseth projected in 2009 that as much as $100 billion per year would be needed 
to prepare all developing countries for climate change (Flam and Skjaerseth, 2009). Similarly, 
an assessment from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, European 
Environment Agency, and other institutions calculated that at least $70 to $100 billion of 
investment will be needed per year for every year from 2010 to 2050 if climate change 
adaptation needs are to be met (Füssel et al., 2012).  Secondly, after having secured pledges of 
just over $10 billion, the GCF now faces the challenging task of moving from resource 
mobilization to implementation (King, 2016). 
 
Resilience (moderately weak) 
Given that contributions to the GCF by states or private parties are voluntary, along 
with its governing structure that avoids putting the Fund directly under COP authority, critics 
view the GCF as moving away from the UNFCCC principles and processes, especially the 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” principle (Vanderheiden, 2016). This has hurt 
actors willing to participate in the network.  A small handful of key European and North 
American donors have been responsible for the bulk of funding so far.  
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5. Conclusions and Discussion  
Although care must be taken when generalizing our findings from a small sample of 
course cases, a first conclusion that follows from our assessment of the four transnational 
governance networks is that they must govern a complex set of arrangements. The CCI 
operates at a nexus of business, politics, lenders, and experts, with most of its partners being 
cities. REEEP works primarily with financial institutions and investors as well as engineering 
and technology firms. GACC works mostly with NGOs and state based donors.  GCF works 
mostly with nation states and nationally designated actors under the UNFCCC but, to 
implement its actions on the ground, it works with a network of accredited partners. 
Second, however, is that each network has strengths and weaknesses (which we 
summarize in Table 1).  Some of the criteria may create tradeoffs with each other; each 
network is truly “strong” at the moment in only one category or two categories only, i.e. CCI 
in resilience and institutional formality, REEEP and the GFC in formality, GACC in clarity of 
purpose and resilience.  No network scores well on all of our criteria, which suggests that 
polycentric governance networks fail to meet the criteria set out by public administration 
about what constitutes an effective institution.   
Table 1: Qualitative Evaluation of Four Climate and Energy Governance Networks  
 Clarity of 
Purpose 
Resources/ 
Funding  
Institutional 
Formality 
Efficacy  Level of 
Resilience  
Clinton Climate 
Initiative  
Moderately 
strong 
Moderately 
weak 
Moderately 
strong 
Moderately 
weak 
Strong 
Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
Partnership 
Strong Weak Strong 
Moderately 
weak  
Moderately 
strong 
Global Alliance for 
Clean Cookstoves  
Strong 
Moderately 
strong 
Moderately 
strong 
Moderately 
strong 
Strong 
Green Climate Fund  
Weak Weak Strong Weak 
Moderately 
weak 
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Put another way, despite its promise, polycentric governance networks in action seem 
to succumb to their challenges. CCI’s programs struggle to overcome lack of knowledge 
about energy efficiency practices and technologies, split incentives, the first cost hurdle, and a 
misalignment of government incentives.  REEEP must work in environments with weak 
capacity and also is subject to on and off again funding streams that are somewhat 
idiosyncratic.  GACC faces social acceptance issues as well as contestation over what 
constitutes a “clean” technology.  GCF faces disagreement within the COP process and paltry 
donations so far. All four networks seem underfunded—and therefore ineffective—
concomitant to the challenges they face. This way, our study adds to the voices who regard 
the “polycentric turn” in international energy and climate governance with a healthy dose of 
caution (Jordan et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the results of our analysis corroborate the observations of previous 
studies regarding the importance of the internal organizational structure of transnational 
governance networks for their effectiveness (e.g., Szulecki et al., 2011). Yet, our study brings 
additional nuance to this thesis, as it tentatively suggests that not all four criteria seem equally 
important. The level of resilience, or the relationships between parts of the network, does not 
seem to be a robust predictor of the overall effectiveness of the network. As Table 1 (above) 
shows, even networks that are strongly resilient can suffer from low levels of effectiveness, 
with the CCI being a prime example. Indeed, a hypothesis that warrants further examination is 
whether some of these criteria (e.g., the level of funding) constitute necessary conditions that 
need to be met before other conditions (e.g., network characteristics such as resilience or 
formality) come into play. 
In a world where polycentric governance networks are thriving and not likely to wither 
away, the challenge of how they are governed remains a pertinent one. There have been some 
sporadic calls and proposals to change the meta-governance of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
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to increase their effectiveness (e.g., Chan and Pauw, 2014), but as Pattberg and Widerberg 
(2016) observe: “these calls for more overall synergies can only be realized if the building 
blocks, i.e., the individual governance arrangements, are designed and implemented in ways 
that enable their success.” 
By assembling multiple actors from different branches of society, polycentric 
governance networks present a promising channel to coordinate efforts at improving 
sustainable development—albeit one that does not fully live up to its potential. These 
networks can be strengthened internally if they more strictly abide by key meta-governance 
principles such as network framing (clarity of purpose); network design (funding and 
formality); and relationships between parts (resilience). Powerful public or private actors 
could intervene directly to strengthen the networks on these critical issues. Leadership, like 
nature, abhors a vacuum.  
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